

**Managing the Security Dilemma in East Asia:
The Potential and Performance of
Confidence Building Measures***

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Abstract:

After the end of the Cold War, many states in East Asia embarked on robust military build-up and defence modernisation programs. In light of this development, one of the main security concerns in the region stemmed from the fact that such weapons acquisition programs were conducted with a relative lack of transparency with respect to regional states' objectives and motivations. In an effort to prevent the military build-up/modernisation programs from escalating into a regional arms race, East Asian countries began implementing confidence building measures (CBMs) mainly through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This paper assesses the performance of the CBMs that have been implemented in the region and examines their potential in preventing arms races. The paper finds that most measures implemented in East Asia are transparency measures which do not require strong political commitment, while the implementation of constraint measures remains minimal. The region, thus, has not reached a point where it is sufficient to prevent arms races. One of the important reasons for this insufficient level of cooperation stems from the lack of the acceptance of the status quo. Without the acceptance of the status quo or an agreement that the status quo is changed only through peaceful means, CBMs and arms control arrangements will be of nominal value in East Asia.

Introduction

Overcoming the security dilemma is one of the most important challenges that states in East Asia face today in the twenty-first century.¹ Since the end of the Cold War, the region has made efforts to ease the security dilemma. An assessment of whether the region has overcome or mitigated the security dilemma gets into a very tricky terrain because the heart of the problem of the security dilemma lies in one's uncertainty and anxiety as to his neighbours' intentions. Being incapable of reading one's mind, one's analysis and determination of intangibles alone will only draw insubstantial assessment. To determine to the point where it is sufficient to reflect upon policy making whether and to what extent states have successfully overcome or mitigated their fear and anxiety towards others is thus very problematic.

By applying the concept of the security dilemma, however, this problem can be mitigated. The security dilemma holds that mutual suspicion and fear which springs from cognitive uncertainty steers states to compete with one another by ratcheting up weapons, which can well escalate into an outright arms race and possibly a war. Therefore, one way to determine whether or not states alleviate the security dilemma is to see the anticipated outcome of the security dilemma: the existence of an arms race. An examination of whether or not the region is witnessing an arms race has one strong advantage in terms of the maintenance

of security in that it is not the security dilemma *per se* that is destabilizing to regional security, but arms racing.

Having said that, notwithstanding the importance of the question on the existence of an arms race, the purpose of this paper is not to determine whether or not East Asia is witnessing a regional arms race, but to assess whether regional efforts are effectively and efficiently made to prevent one. This paper does so by asking two questions. First, has multilateral security cooperation made progress in accordance with the regional military build-up? Second, if so, is the region well instituted to prevent arms races from occurring, or should they occur, prevent them from escalating into war? This paper seeks to evaluate such efforts by comparing regional trends in arms acquisitions and developments in multilateral security cooperation. Here, particular attention is given to naval weapons because acquisitions states are robustly making are such weapons and they are considered disturbing. Naval weapons include “all sea-based conventional military weapons, platforms and weapons systems, but include land-based air forces that have a major maritime role regardless of which armed service operates them.”² The study is in part an attempt to answer a broadly shared question of the early 1990s when states in East Asia embarked on their robust weapons acquisitions programs. The question was put most plainly by Amitav Acharya and Panitan Wattanayagorn and Desmond Ball:

What efforts could and should be undertaken to ensure that this build-up does not become a threat to regional security and stability?³

The critical question is whether or not [transparency and regional security forums] and other mechanisms for enhanced dialogue, consultation and co-operation can be instituted to the point where they can enable the effective management of the burgeoning arms acquisition and defence modernization programmes to prevent them from degenerating into a regional arms race.⁴

Arms Races

In spite of the vast amount of literature on the linkage between arms races and war, there is no clear evidence that arms races cause war. Nevertheless, there

are strong associations between them. For example, Michael Wallace found that 82% of inter-state disputes preceded by an arms race escalated to war whereas only 4% of such disputes not preceded by an arms race resulted in war.⁵ More recently, Susan Sample reached what she called an “inescapable conclusion” that “when two states engaged in a militarised dispute or a series of militarised disputes, they are far more likely to end up at war with one another than are disputing countries that are not involved in an arms race.”⁶

Concerns about An Arms Race in the Early 1990s

As the end of the Cold War neared, states in Southeast Asia shifted their defence doctrines and strategies from counter-insurgency warfare to conventional warfare capabilities, especially maritime forces.⁷ In this connection, there existed a grave concern throughout the East Asian region that weapons acquisitions of regional states could escalate into a regional arms race. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, for instance, made a remark in 1992 that there were “rather disturbing reports of increased arms purchases by several countries in the region.”⁸ The offensive character of some of the weapons acquired and a relative lack of transparency against which the purchases were made were aspects that made them disturbing.⁹ The sense of necessity of confidence building was widely shared throughout the region. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal argued that reducing the risk of an arms race and a subsequent war would require “greater transparency of defence spending, arms transfers, defence doctrines and military deployments.”¹⁰ Amitav Acharya argued, “To ensure that the increasing militarization of the region does not become a destabilizing forces, arms control, confidence-building, and transparency measures could be necessary steps.”¹¹ Various CBMs were proposed¹² and discussed intensively in regional conferences such as the annual *Asia-Pacific Roundtable* hosted by ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) of Malaysia.

Although the region’s prevailing reluctance to create formal regional arms control arrangements was underscored by ASEAN’s response to the proposals of CSCE-type institution made by the former Soviet Union, Australia and Canada, there were also indications that regional policy-makers were becoming

more amenable to transparency and confidence-building. Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew reportedly proposed to Malaysia that the two countries should open their military facilities for mutual inspection, which was "a way to reassure Singapore's neighbours that its arsenal was not offensive in nature."¹³ Also, Malaysia's Defence Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak suggested that regional states should "begin the process of establishing confidence- and security-building measures," promote greater transparency in arms acquisitions and establish a regional arms register so that "suspicion could be minimised and managed."¹⁴ Similarly, in October 1992 Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas proposed confidence-building measures such as inviting observers to and regulation of military exercises, and encouraged greater "transparency in military arrangements through regular exchange of information among the major powers on their military budgets, doctrines and future projections."¹⁵

The danger of a regional arms race was more keenly shared by academic analysts. Some even argued that an arms race was indeed in progress within the region.¹⁶ On the other hand, others dismissed such an allegation and argued that although arms acquisitions of the states in the region were cause for concern, they should be comprehended as the states' response to strategic uncertainty stemming from the end of the Cold War rather than an arms race.¹⁷ Several military and non-military factors behind the arms build-up were identified, including economic growth, the enhanced self-reliance requirement, the drawdown of U.S. presence and power, the increasing competition between the major regional powers, the requirements for Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) surveillance and protection, prestige, technology transfer, corruption and supply-side pressures.¹⁸

What is an Arms Race?

The divide in the determination of the existence of an arms race in the region may in part derive from the elusiveness of the term 'arms race' itself. Although the term has been defined by various scholars in various ways,¹⁹ Barry Buzan and Eric Herring provide a good understanding of the term: An arms race is "an abnormally intense condition in relations between states reflecting either or both

active political rivalry and mutual fear of the other's military potential."²⁰ Because one's arms build-up to defend oneself is a normal behaviour in the world of self-help, we need to distinguish between an 'arms race' and an 'arms build-up', or in Buzan and Herring's definition, between 'normality' and 'abnormality'. Buzan and Herring introduce the term 'arms dynamic', to refer to "the entire set of pressures that make [states] both acquire armed forces and change the quantity and quality of the armed forces they already possess."²¹ The arms dynamic serves as a scale; on the one end of the spectrum lies arms racing, "the most extreme manifestations of the arms dynamic," whereas the other end of the spectrum lies maintenance of the military status quo, "the normal operation of the arms dynamic."²² Thus, "maintenance [of the military status quo] can escalate into [arms] racing, and [arms] racing can subside into maintenance [of the military status quo]."²³

The key notion underlying the term arms race is that "two or more states strenuously engage in a competition to accumulate military strength against each other."²⁴ A rapid pace of arms acquisitions is another usual characteristic of an arms race, but some argue that a race can occur in "slow motion": "If two long-distance runners maintain a steady pace, we consider them to be in a race just as much as if their speed were continually increasing."²⁵ In spite of the differences as to the pace of action and reaction phenomenon, both camps seem to agree on a competitive interaction between states as the prominent feature of arms race. As Bruce Russett put it, "it is the element of competition, or interaction, that makes the race."²⁶ In fact, the interactive competition between states lies at the heart of the action-reaction model, "the classical view of arms racing" which took root in the literature.²⁷ The fundamental proposition of the action-reaction model is that "states strengthen their armaments because of the threats the states perceive from other states."²⁸ Therefore, the problem is not weapons acquisitions *per se*, but the impact these arms have on the threat perception of the competing states. The study that laid stress on threat-perception is found in the work of Robert Jervis.

Offensive and Defensive Weapons

In his "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," Jervis contends that the security dilemma is largely affected by a function of offensive and defensive military strategies and capabilities. Employing two variables (i.e. whether the offence or the defence has the advantage and whether offensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from defensive ones), Jervis yields four hypothetical worlds. In brief, his main argument is that when the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons cannot be made, and the offence has the advantage over the defence, the situation will be very unstable and arms races are likely, with the security dilemma firmly in place; on the other hand, if such a distinction is possible and the defence has the advantage, the situation is very stable, with no security dilemma at work.²⁹ So far as the security dilemma is concerned, the existence of the dilemma primarily depends on the possibility of the distinction between offensive and defensive postures: "When offensive and defensive postures are different, much of the uncertainty about the other's intentions that contributes to the security dilemma is removed."³⁰ And, arms races are likely when the offence has the advantage.³¹

As discerned by Jervis himself, perhaps a major obstacle one encounters in accepting his argument is the possibility of the offence-defence distinction.³² For example, John Mearsheimer contests such an argument that specific weapons cannot be easily classified as either offensive or defensive.³³ Weapons that seem obviously defensive in nature can be used as offensive weapons. For instance, the Egyptian attack on Israel in 1973 demonstrated the efficacy of anti-air capability in aggression that the Egyptian attack would have been impossible without its anti-air capability that defended the Egyptian land forces from the Israeli air raid. By the same token, sea mines will be effective defensive weapons if laid in one's own territorial waters, but become highly offensive if laid around its rival's inshore waters. Thus, whether a particular weapon is offensive or defensive depends on the way in which the weapon is used. Ambiguity in the nature of weapons is particularly true in naval platforms. Eric Grove puts plainly that the offensiveness or otherwise largely depends on the political context in which the weapons are used: "Naval capabilities cannot be divorced from the political context in which they work. Their degree of defensiveness or offensiveness is more a reflection of the intentions of their owners than of the weapons and platforms themselves."³⁴ One admiral supports

Grove's view: "at sea there is no system except possibly the chaff launcher that cannot be used to attack an opponent in some way or another."³⁵ Moreover, given the strategic culture of the region, the distinction can hardly be accepted in the region where offence and defence are considered "both fungible and complementary rather than alternative strategies."³⁶

Power Projection Capability

Nevertheless, it is possible to say that certain weapons are more effectively used in offence than in defence, or vice versa. For example, bombers are normally used for offence. Similarly, although some land attack capability is necessary to defend the country from, say, amphibious assaults, long-range land attack capability is not a prerequisite for national defence, but more effectively employed for offensive purposes. Long-range land attack aircraft are therefore offence-oriented. On the other hand, in spite of the efficacy of anti-air capability in an invasion as demonstrated in the 1973 Egyptian attack, such capability is more effectively used for defence since anti-air capability alone does not allow state to invade another state's territory. Weapons with offensive orientation can thus be characterised by their ability to penetrate enemy's defences and key strategic assets, reach deep into enemy territory and occupy it.³⁷

Grove suggests that one way to discern such offence-oriented weapons from others is to examine the reach of (1) the weapons themselves; (2) the individual platforms in the fleet; and (3) the fleet as a whole.³⁸ In addition to the reach, the capability of surprises is often considered an offensive element.³⁹ Based on his criteria, Grove raises several naval weapons and platforms that are offence-oriented: long-range land attack missiles, long-range anti-ship missiles, nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs), long-range maritime strike aircraft and large aircraft carriers.⁴⁰ From these military inventories tell us what gives a weapon/platform an offensive orientation is "the combination of long range with a potent and specialised strike capacity."⁴¹ This could well mean a weapon/platform with power projection capability. According to one naval officer, power projection is

not just the capacity to land troops from the sea in a combat posture...it must include the capacity to supply them once ashore, and reinforce them if necessary. But it includes also the ability to bombard, from ships or aircraft, the opponent's land areas; and this ability may of course be used in support of amphibious forces, before, during, or after a landing.⁴²

The heads of states and policy-makers would be highly disturbed and driven to acquire weapons if they perceive their adversaries or neighbours enhancing power projection capability. This could well spark off a regional arms race.

Trends in Naval Weapons Acquisitions

Despite the divide between analysts over the existence of an arms race in the early 1990s, the 'first round' of regional arms acquisitions did not seem to warrant the term arms racing. Lacking several important characteristics of an arms race—action-reaction dynamics, a rapid rate of acquisitions and very high defence expenditure in terms of gross domestic product (GDP)—Desmond Ball concluded that there was no arms race undergoing in the region.⁴³ Similarly, because military acquisitions of regional states are driven by strategic uncertainty rather than the reciprocal threat perceptions, Amitav Acharya argued that to label the entire phenomenon as a regional arms race was "misleading."⁴⁴ However, that the first round of force modernisation in the early 1990s did not develop into an arms race is no guarantee that it won't escalate in the future. In fact, there are disquieting reports in the wake of the Asian financial crisis that regional states are resuming their military modernisation programs, and some naval developments suggest that a naval arms race is well underway in the region:

The current surge in naval spending has more serious overtones than that which occurred in the early and mid-1990s prior to the economic downturn that began in 1997. The 'first round' of naval expansion was argued away on the basis that it was part of an understandable non-threatening process of modernisation. This does not appear to be the case with this 'second round' of naval expansion, which appears to be much more clearly posited on assessments of threats posed by other countries. Most of the current trends with naval capabilities and strategic initiatives are in the wrong direction in terms of their impact on the future stability of the region.... [A] naval arms race is increasingly evident in the region.⁴⁵

*Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft*⁴⁶

In 1999, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force bought forty Russian Sukhoi Su-30MKK (*Flanker-C*) fighter/ground attack aircraft (FGAs) as upgrade for its existing Su-27s. China plans to acquire more *Flanker-Cs*. The Sukhois will place China's air capabilities roughly on a par with those of most states in East Asia.⁴⁷ The Su-30 can be equipped with air-launched version of the SS-N-22 *Sunburn* missiles and the AA-12 *Adder* air-to-air missiles (AAMs).⁴⁸ Japan's major production program is the Mitsubishi F-2 multi-role fighter aircraft, which is a derivative of the U.S. F-16. Japan decided to produce 130 F-2 fighters. North Korea purchased a total of forty MiG-21 fighters from Kazakhstan and Russia in 1999. The ROK ordered twenty F-16C/D fighters in 1999 and forty F-15K fighters in 2002, to be delivered in as early as 2003 and 2005 respectively from the United States. Taiwan obtained 150 F-16s and sixty *Mirage* 2000s.

In Southeast Asia and Australasia, Thailand purchased eighteen F-16 *Fighting Falcons* from the United States in September 2000.⁴⁹ Singapore also acquired twenty F-16s in 2000. Also in late 2001, Singapore announced to seek a squadron of new multi-role fighter aircraft from 2006-07 to replace its current A-4 *Skyhawks*. Indonesia received sixteen of British *Hawk* 209 FGAs in 1999, and announced to buy Russian aircraft with gunship and anti-submarine capabilities.⁵⁰ Myanmar purchased ten MiG-29 *Fulcrum* fighters and two MiG-29UB trainers in July 2001. Malaysia seeks to buy up to eighteen F/A-18F *Super Hornets* and several Sukhoi Su-30 multi-role aircraft.⁵¹

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft

In the late 1990s, China acquired six Tu-154M *Careless* electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft.⁵² In addition, China is to have up to six Russian A-50E *Mainstay* Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. The A-50Es will give Beijing "a substantial boost in its offensive air capability" against Taiwan.⁵³ China is developing several surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).⁵⁴ In addition to JASDF's (Japanese Air Self-Defence Force) thirteen E-2C *Hawkeye* Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and JMSDF's (Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force) five EP-3 *Orions* ELINT aircraft, the JASDF purchased four

Boeing E-767 AWACS. Similarly, the ROK is to acquire four B-767 AWACS from the United States. South Korea also operates ten *Hawker* 800SIG signals intelligence (SIGINT)/ELINT aircraft. In an attempt to improve its air reconnaissance capability, Taiwan ordered an early warning radar equivalent to U.S. *Pave Paws* radar in 1999 and four E-2T *Hawkeye* ELINT aircraft. Australia, in addition to its two EP-3C ELINT aircraft, is to have four or possibly seven Boeing 737 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft in 2007.

Aerial Tankers

China is believed to operate ten domestically produced XAC H-6U in-flight tankers to support multi-role fighter aircraft such as J-7, J-8IID and J-11/Su-27, with more in prospect.⁵⁵ Japan has decided to acquire four aerial tankers for its Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF). These Boeing 747 aircraft will make air defence more efficient and allow its AWACS to operate further afield from Japan's territorial airspace, thereby supporting JMSDF's blue water operations. Further south, Singapore has four KC-135R in-flight tankers for its F-16 fighters. Australia is considering replacing its Boeing 707 aerial tankers up to five.⁵⁶

*Surface Combatants*⁵⁷

PLA Navy (PLAN) has ordered two 8,000-ton *Sovremenny* destroyers (DDGs)—*Hangzhou* and *Fu Zhou*—from Russia, and to buy two more of them. The *Sovremennys* were delivered to China's East Sea Fleet, which is tasked with the Taiwan problem, in February and June 2000.⁵⁸ The *Sovremenny*-class destroyers can carry the SS-N-22 *Sunburn* anti-ship missiles.⁵⁹ The SS-N-22 was "specifically designed to penetrate the defensive barrier of a U.S. *Aegis* system and attack an aircraft carrier."⁶⁰ Domestically, it has begun building two *Luhai* DDGs. The *Sovremenny* and *Luhai* DDGs will arm SS-N-22 *Sunburn* anti-ship missiles to match the U.S. *Aegis* air defence system. China also plans to order two *Slava*-class cruisers equipped with P-500 anti-ship missiles with a range of 550 kms.⁶¹ PLAN wishes to be the second navy in Asia to acquire aircraft carriers (CVVs), next to Thailand which has introduced an 11,500-ton *Chakri Naruebet*-class aircraft carrier in 1997.⁶² The options range from small (23,000-25,000 tons) CVVs to 48,000-ton Russian *Admiral Kuznetsov*-class

CVVs.⁶³ If acquired, it is expected that the former will be armed with short take-off/vertical-landing (STOVL) aircraft and helicopters while the latter will carry anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.⁶⁴ Across the strait, Taiwan ordered four U.S. *Kidd*-class DDGs.

Japan is designing two 13,500-ton helicopter-carrying cruisers. The Republic of Korea is developing three KDX-2 DDGs to be delivered in 2004 and is planning to order three KDX-3 *Aegis*-class DDGs. The destroyers will enhance South Korea's blue water capability for air defence and anti-surface warfare. Taiwan is to acquire a landing ship dock (LSD) *Anchorage* to replace existing two LSDs.

Singapore is to obtain six *Lafayette*-class frigates (FFs) from France in 2005. Since March 2000, under what is known as Project Delta, Singapore's Navy, in collaboration with French engineering group DCN, is building six new 3,200-ton stealth frigates, all of which are due to enter service by 2009.⁶⁵ When in operational, these frigates will be the largest surface combatants in Singapore's Navy, and will greatly improve its anti-air, -surface and -submarine warfare capabilities.⁶⁶

Submarines

PLAN is developing 6,000-ton Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), which can carry torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and land-attack cruise missiles. Employing towed array sonar, the Type 093 will represent a significant improvement in China's anti-ship capability and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).⁶⁷ Further, the Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is under development, which will employ the more advanced JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).⁶⁸ The advanced JL-2 SLBMs are capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and have a longer range than the previous version.⁶⁹ In addition to domestic production, China has ordered eight *Kilo* conventional submarines (SSKs) with ASW capability, armed with *Klub* long-range anti-ship missile systems. China further plans to purchase *Akula* SSNs from Russia.⁷⁰

Since 1998, Japan has commissioned five *Oyashio*-class submarines, and four more are scheduled to be commissioned by the mid-2006.⁷¹ South Korea purchased three Type 214 SSKs from Germany, to be delivered in 2007-09. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia placed orders for two French *Scorpene* SSKs, to be delivered in 2007 and 2008.

Amphibious Forces

Serious amphibious forces are built up in Australia, Japan and Singapore. Australia is planning to enhance its amphibious capabilities by introducing three 25,000-30,000-ton landing platform dock/helicopter (LPD/H) vessels in the 2010-2015 period. The JMSDF has been introducing three 8,900-ton *Osumi*-class LPDs since 1998 whereas Singapore has commissioned four 8,500-ton *Endurance*-class LPDs since 2000. The *Osumi* and *Endurance* only have helicopter platforms, but the former can transport 330 troops, ninety tanks and two landing craft (LCAC) while the latter can transport 350 troops, eighteen tanks, twenty vehicles and four vehicle, personnel landing craft (LCVP).⁷²

Smaller in water displacement than the three states mentioned, PLAN has introduced two more *Yuting*-class tank landing ships (LSTs) since 1999 to the existing six. Each vessel is able to carry 250 troops, ten tanks and four LCVPs. South Korea has introduced another 4,300-ton *Alligator*-class LST in 1999, making the total of four LSTs for its navy.⁷³

Ballistic Missiles

The deployment of China's inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) *Dong-Feng* (DF)-15, DF-11 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and modernised DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in the coastal area across the Taiwan Strait has increased to 150-200 since 1996. DF-31 with a range up to 8,000 km could start to be deployed between 2002 and 2005. A longer range ICBM DF-41 with a range up to 12,000-km is under development, expected to enter service in 2005. A submarine-launched type of DF-31, JL-2, is also under development.

Conventional Missiles

Almost all the states in the region possess advanced anti-ship missiles such as *Harpoon* and *Exocet*. They are also seeking various types of conventional missiles. China has ordered up to twelve 90-150 km-range SA-10 *Grumble* S300 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). China is also seeking SS-N-24 surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) for its *Sovremennys* and Kh-35 ASMs for Su-30MKKs. Japan produced its Type-88 and Type-99 anti-ship missiles, and also ordered sixteen U.S. *Standard* Block III SAMs. The ROK is seeking a number of SAMs and anti-ship missiles including RAM Block I, *Standard*, SM-2 SAMs, *Harpoons* and ATACMS anti-ship missiles. Myanmar is seeking to acquire R-27 (or A-10 *Alamo*) medium- to long-range, infrared and radar-guided air-to-air missiles for the ten MiG-29 aircraft purchased from Russia. Singapore is also seeking MM-40 *Exocets*. Australia ordered Norwegian *Penguin* anti-ship missiles. Several states in the region are seeking the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have already acquired AMRAAMs; the delivery to Thailand and Singapore is on hold; and Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are showing interest in AMRAAMs.⁷⁴

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBMs)

Just before the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF) was established, Singaporean Defence Minister Yeo Ning Hong said in an interview that “greater transparency in armaments and arms control measures” would be an important task for the ARF.⁷⁵ The ARF embarked on CBMs to promote greater transparency. Although definitions and typologies of CBMs are many and varied, in general, measures can be sorted into two broad categories: transparency measures and constraint measures. Transparency measures, which comprise information exchange, communication, notification, observation and inspection and declaratory measures, are designed to reduce mistrust and uncertainty and, conversely, build trust among states by revealing their military intentions and capabilities.⁷⁶ Constraint measures are to restrict military operations through such measures as risk reduction measures and exclusion/separation zones.⁷⁷

While C(S)BM s in Europe encompassed both types, CBMs in East Asia have focused exclusively on transparency measures. This low priority given to constraint measures is partly because fear of surprise attack is not keenly shared in the region.⁷⁸ As the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) stated, CBMs were “basically aimed at enhancing transparency between states.”⁷⁹ The CSCAP Working Group on CSBMs has defined CBMs as “both formal and informal measures, whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, that address, prevent, or resolve uncertainties among states, including both military and political elements. Such measures contribute to a reduction of uncertainty, misperception, and suspicion.”⁸⁰ Finally, although the ARF does not define CBMs, that all the measures listed under CBMs in Annex A of its *Concept Paper* are categorised as transparency measures clearly illustrates this point.

Despite the divide among policy-makers and analysts in the evaluation of the pace of the ARF process, the region has made steady progress in confidence building. Although the focus of the study is multilateralism, bilateral efforts are also looked at briefly. Because bilateral dialogues and exercises are an important part of regional confidence building, dismissing them merely because they are bilateral overlooks the point that bilateral efforts, especially between the major powers, have significant ramifications for the entire region. In light of the qualitative aspect of multilateralism as defined by John Ruggie, bilateral endeavours can be multilateral in principle given the indivisible nature of regional peace and security and their effects that can have upon the interests of others.⁸¹

Transparency Measures

Security Dialogues

THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF)

It is generally accepted that the most important development in this realm has been the establishment of the ARF. The first ARF meeting drew together foreign ministers from seventeen countries and one organization.⁸² At present, the ARF

consists of twenty-three members.⁸³ As the 'A' of the ARF suggests, ASEAN is the driving force of the Forum and chairmanship of the ministerial meetings rotates among the ASEAN states. In effect the ARF functions at two levels, albeit it is one institution: ministerial and senior officials. At the ministerial level, the ARF holds its annual ministerial meeting in July or August in an ASEAN capital. At the senior officials level, on the other hand, the ARF holds the intersessional and support group meetings several times a year between the ministerial meeting and ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in May. Among the several intersessional meetings (ISMs), the Intersessional Support Group (ISG) on CBMs will be paid particular attention here.

THE ARF MINISTERIAL MEETINGS. As agreed at the SOM of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in July 1993, the first ARF meeting took place in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. The meeting was marked as a historic event because it was "the first time ever that high-ranking representatives from the majority of states in the Asia-Pacific region came to specifically discuss political and security cooperation issues."⁸⁴ The objective of the ARF was spelled out in Bangkok: "to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern [by] mak[ing] significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region."⁸⁵

The second ARF ministerial meeting was held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam on 1 August 1995. The ministers adopted *The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper*, which was prepared by the ARF-SOM. They agreed that the ARF would adopt a gradual evolutionary approach, taking place in three stages: (1) Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures; (2) Development of Preventive Diplomacy; and (3) Elaboration of Approaches to Conflicts.⁸⁶

The ARF *Concept Paper* stipulates that the ARF would adopt two approaches in promoting CBMs. The first approach stems from ASEAN's experience: "the ASEAN approach" or the so-called ASEAN way, which is the Association's "well established practices of consultation and consensus (*musyawarah* and *mufakat*)."⁸⁷ The ASEAN approach, according to the *Concept*

Paper, “[promotes] regional cooperation and [creates] a regional climate conducive to peace and prosperity without the implementation of explicit confidence building measures.”⁸⁸ The second approach of the ARF in promoting confidence building is the implementation of concrete CBMs. The concrete CBMs comprise two lists of CBMs, attached as Annexes A and B in the *Concept Paper*. Annex A lists measures to be “explored and implemented” by the ARF members in the immediate future whereas Annex B indicates measures and proposals to be “explored over the medium and long-term” by the members.⁸⁹ By the third and fourth ministerial meetings, the ARF members exhibited “a high degree of comfort in their interactions with each other,”⁹⁰ and it was observed that a “sense of community” was emerging among them.⁹¹ In 1999, the ministers at the sixth ministerial meeting recognized that there was direct linkage between the increased comfort level and confidence building, stating that “enhanced comfort levels have enabled ARF participants to exchange views frankly on issues of common concern, thereby encouraging greater transparency and mutual understanding.”⁹²

The ARF ministerial meetings comprise foreign ministers of the respective states in the Asia-Pacific, but security dialogues among defence and military officials would significantly contribute to confidence building. Although, many states in the region preferred not having military-to-military talks because they felt uncomfortable revealing their defence-related sources to others, their views began to change in 1998. At the fifth ministerial meeting held in Manila, the ministers welcomed “the informal gathering at lunch of senior defence and military officials in Langkawi in 1997” and noted that “defence and military officials had a constructive contribution” to regional security cooperation.⁹³ The ministers further encouraged this practice and the latter’s active participation “at appropriate levels in all relevant ARF activities.”⁹⁴

Even though concerns about the scope and pace of military build-up in the region and the danger of an arms race were widely recognized by many policy-makers and analysts, they were never brought up before the discussion table until the ministers met for the seventh time. At the seventh ARF ministerial meeting in Bangkok on 27 July 2000, they discussed the implications of ballistic missile defence systems, namely U.S.’s Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).

Though refrained from referring to the United States, China and Russia openly opposed and criticized TMD, arguing that such a defence system would make the region unstable. In response to the Chinese and Russian statements, the United States and Japan argued for TMD that the defence system was only for defence purposes and would enhance, rather than undermine, regional security. Japan, for example, indicated the necessity of missile defence system by alleging that the fundamental problem was rather the development and proliferation of ballistic missiles.⁹⁵

THE INTERSESSIONAL SUPPORT GROUP ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. The ISG on CBMs was set up as a result of the agreement reached at the second ARF ministerial meeting in 1995. The ISG on CBMs and other ISMs are to assist the ARF-SOM in making recommendations to the ministerial meetings. The meetings of ISG on CBMs are usually held biannually hosted by ASEAN and non-ASEAN members. The first ISG meetings took place in Tokyo and Jakarta on 18-19 January and 15-16 April 1996 respectively.

The ISG on CBMs is an actual mechanism that implements measures that are agreed at the second ARF ministerial meeting, attached as Annexes A and B. Therefore, the agenda items of the ISG meetings necessarily focus on those listed in the Annex. The participants at the first ISG meetings, for instance, had four main agendas: dialogue on security perceptions (Item 3 of Annex A), defence policy publications (Item 4 of Annex A), enhancing high-level defence contacts and exchanges among defence staff colleges and training (Items 6 and 7 of Annex A), and the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA) (Item 5 of Annex A).⁹⁶ The ISG on CBMs became active from the third round of ISG meetings of 1997-1998.

The 1997-98 ISG on CBMs, co-chaired by Brunei Darussalam and Australia, took place in Bandar Seri Begawan and Sydney on 4-6 November 1997 and 4-6 March 1998 respectively. In these meetings the ISG examined the implementation status of the agreed CBMs of Annex A and recommended two sets of new CBMs for future implementation. Basket One consisted of those measures that should be implemented in the near term—over next two intersessional years—whereas Basket Two contained measures for

consideration in the medium term.⁹⁷ Since then, it has become the practice of the ISG on CBMs to update the list of CBMs by adding new measures, moving some from Basket Two to Basket One, and removing those that have been implemented. Furthermore, many confidence building-related seminars and meetings under the auspices of the ISG on CBMs began taking place after 1997-98. Table 1 shows the seminars and meetings convened under the auspices of the ISG on CBMs.

In relation to the region's arms build-up and the danger of an arms race, the ISG on CBMs has never given primary importance to the issue. For example, *Co-Chairmen's Summary Reports of the Meetings of the ARF ISG on CBMs* in 1997-98 and 1998-99 had only a few sentences and merely stated "the importance of transparency."⁹⁸ On the contrary, the participants were concerned about the potential impact of the 1997 financial crisis on their defence programs.⁹⁹

In addition to the ARF, there are other official multilateral security dialogue forums in the region such as the Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC), the Pacific Area Special Operations Conference (PASOC), the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

THE COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (CSCAP)

CSCAP was established a year before the ARF was set up.¹⁰⁰ It is a Track Two institution where government officials and scholars participate in their private capacities. This is an important advantage of CSCAP. Since it is a non-official forum, participants can freely utter their views on sensitive issues that cannot be brought up in official forums. Secondly, with government officials attending, CSCAP attracts governments' attention. Although CSCAP has no formal link with the ARF, one of the most important objectives is its utility to the ARF. CSCAP's main activity is done by its Working Groups (WGs), which are "to undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional and sub-regional political-security problems."¹⁰¹ There are five WGs on CSBMs, Concepts of Cooperative and Comprehensive Security, Maritime Cooperation, the North Pacific and Transnational Crime. The work of the CSBM WG is given focus here.

In the early years, the work of the CSBM WG focused on CBMs, and produced CSCAP Memorandum No. 2 and published one edited book and four occasional papers. In promoting transparency, perhaps the most important contribution of the CSBM WG is its production of “a generic model for developing a defence white paper, which could be considered as a general format [for use] by interested parties.”¹⁰² The model was reportedly applied in defence White Papers of Mongolia and Vietnam and partially employed by China and Taiwan.¹⁰³ The WG also examined the utility of UN Conventional Arms Register as well as the possibility of a Regional Arms Register, but the work on arms registers has been stagnant.¹⁰⁴ In recent years, the CSBM WG has focused on preventive diplomacy and nuclear energy/PACATOM (an Asian or Pacific Atomic Energy Community).¹⁰⁵

BILATERAL DIALOGUES

Although bilateral dialogues are more extensive and have been held much earlier than multilateral dialogues, active interactions between non-allies are a relatively new occurrence since security dialogues conducted during the Cold War were usually between allies. The post-Cold War era witnessed holding of dialogues that went beyond the alliance structure. This is especially the case in Northeast Asia. For example, Japan and South Korea only began their regularly-held defence policy dialogue in 1994. Other examples include dialogues and/or consultations between Japan and Russia since 1992; Japan and China since 1993; and China and the United States since 1997 though the formal Sino-U.S. military-to-military contacts began in 1979. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Singapore launched a bilateral security dialogue called the Malaysia-Singapore Defence Forum in Singapore in January 1995.¹⁰⁶

Publication of Defence Papers

Publication of defence White Papers or defence policy statements helps clarify states' security perceptions and strategic/defence doctrines and policies and dispel suspicions. Many states in Northeast Asia and Australasia have published defence papers much earlier than those in Southeast Asia. Japan published its first *Defense of Japan* in 1971, with its second in 1976, and has

published annually since then; South Korea has published its annual *Defense White Paper* since 1988; and Taiwan began publishing its *National Defense Report* every two years since 1992. In Southeast Asia, one of the first ASEAN states to issue its defence policy statements was Singapore, which has done so since 1990. Thailand issued its first defence paper in May 1994, and its second in March 1996.¹⁰⁷ Also in 1994, the Malaysian Armed Forces, albeit not an official defence policy statement, released a book that had contents equivalent to other ASEAN defence policy statements.¹⁰⁸ Though the role of the ARF on this matter is debatable, an increasing number of ARF members are publishing their defence policy papers since the ARF was set up. Indonesia published its first defence paper entitled *The Policy of the State Defence and Security of the Republic of Indonesia* in August 1995; China issued its first defence policy statement in November 1995 and first defence White Paper *China's National Defense* in July 1998; Mongolia published its first *Defense White Paper* in 1997; and Cambodia issued its first entitled *Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia: Security and Development* in 2000. The Philippines and Vietnam are also considering releasing their defence policy statements.¹⁰⁹

ANNUAL SECURITY OUTLOOK (ASO)

Although the *Annual Security Outlook* (ASO) was considered a matter that would overlap between CBMs and PD in ARF standards, it would be relevant to discuss the ASO here since it is equivalent to defence policy statement. The ASO is a compilation of papers reviewing the regional security situation. The first volume of the ASO was compiled by Thailand and was presented to the seventh ARF ministerial meeting in July 2000. The *Annual Security Outlook 2000* stated that “the production of the ASO [would constitute] a concrete step forward in helping promote mutual understanding, confidence and transparency among the ARF participants.”¹¹⁰ For the first ASO, 13 out of 22 members submitted their papers, amounting to approximately 60 percent rate of submission. Among the thirteen members, only two ASEAN countries, Singapore and Thailand, presented their papers. For ASEAN, a driving force of the ARF, the fact that only two of the members submitted their papers was disappointing. The second volume of the ASO had 16 country papers out of 23 members, with four new presenters, namely, Cambodia, Democratic People's

Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam,¹¹¹ while the third ASO gathered thirteen country papers, with Brunei Darussalam first submitting its paper.¹¹²

The UN Register of Conventional Arms

Almost all the states in East Asia have reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which was established in December 1991.¹¹³ UN members were requested to provide data on an annual basis on the number of weapons in seven categories imported and exported during the previous calendar year.¹¹⁴ In addition to exports and imports of arms, member states are encouraged to provide “background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies.”¹¹⁵ Within the region Australia, China, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the ROK and Singapore have submitted their reports since the Register’s first year while Indonesia has done so since the second year in 1994.¹¹⁶ Before the first ARF meeting took place in 1994, therefore, thirteen of the seventeen participants presented their reports to the Register.¹¹⁷ Of the thirteen states, those who provided background information along with the data on imports and exports were Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the United States. Thailand and Vietnam have participated in the Register since 1995; Brunei provided its data in 1996 and 1997; and Cambodia joined it in 1999.¹¹⁸ Those who have not submitted their reports are Laos, Myanmar and North Korea.¹¹⁹

Military Exercises

MULTILATERAL EXERCISES

Under the auspices of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) signed in 1971 by Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, an Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) was set up to develop and maintain an air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore. To meet the objective, the five powers hold air defence exercises (ADEX) under the IADS such as *Stardex* and *Flying Fish*, both of which focus on air and sea control.¹²⁰ For example, *Flying Fish 2000*, the second in a series of triennial exercises since 1997, took place in the waters of the South China Sea and the air space of Singapore and

the Malaya Peninsula, involving two submarines, 32 ships, 89 planes and 5,000 personnel from the five FPDA members.¹²¹

In the post-Cold War era, the number of multilateral exercises has increased. Many multilateral exercises in the region involve the United States. Major exercises include *Cope Thunder*, *Cope Tiger*, *Team Challenge*, *MCMEX* (*Western Pacific Mine Countermeasure Exercise*), *Pacific Reach* and *RIMPAC* (*Rim of the Pacific*). *Cope Thunder* and *Cope Tiger* are annual air combat exercises. The former is conducted up to four times a year over Alaskan and Canadian airspace. Since its inception in 1976, *Cope Thunder* has attracted Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The latter air exercise, *Cope Tiger*, brings together air forces from Singapore, Thailand and the United States. In *Cope Tiger*, the three countries conduct a flying training exercise involving both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat missions over Thai airspace.

Team Challenge is a multilateral exercise that combines three of the largest bilateral exercises in East Asia—*Balikatan* (Philippines-U.S.), *Cobra Gold* (Thailand-U.S.) and *Tandem Thrust* (Australia-U.S.)—into one large exercise, though the three exercises still exist. At its first *Team Challenge* in April and May 2001, Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States focused on training in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. *Cobra Gold* by itself became multilateral in 2000 joined by Singapore, reflecting the belief of many military planners that multilateral responses will likely to be the future norm against regional contingencies.¹²² In 2002, *Cobra Gold* attracted the sum of eighteen countries, with new observers such as Japan, China and Russia. Malaysia indicated its will of participation in the exercise from 2003 onwards.

The next three exercises—*MCMEX*, *Pacific Reach* and *RIMPAC*—are multilateral naval exercises aimed at maintaining the safety of international waterways. The oldest exercise among the three is *RIMPAC*, which is conducted since 1971. *RIMPAC* is a biennial large-scale multilateral sea control exercise, which takes place in the waters off Hawaii. The objective of the exercise is to enhance the tactical capabilities of the states of the Pacific Rim to

ensure the safety of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Usual participants of *RIMPAC* are Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, the ROK, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Exercise *Pacific Reach* is a biennial multilateral submarine rescue exercise ever held in the Asia-Pacific.¹²³ *Pacific Reach* reflected the region's enhanced need for a submarine rescue operation in two ways. Firstly, the need stems from the increased possibility of underwater collision because submarines increasingly conduct surveillance and reconnaissance missions in the relatively shallow waters. Secondly, as evidenced by the stranded Russian submarine *Kursk* incident in August 2000, the need for greater interoperability in submarine rescue among countries was acknowledged. The Republic of Singapore Navy hosted the first exercise conducted in the South China Sea in October 2000 joined by Japan, the ROK, Singapore and the United States as participants and Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Indonesia, Russia and the United Kingdom as observers.¹²⁴ The second *Pacific Reach* was conducted in April 2002 off the southwest coast of the island of Kyushu, Japan. *Pacific Reach 2002* marked the first time for Japan to host a multilateral exercise in history. Australia joined the exercise as a new participant.¹²⁵

The first multilateral mine countermeasure exercise held in June 2001 was *MCMEX*. Hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy, navies of Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Thailand and the United States conducted a twelve-day exercise in the Straits of Singapore and the South China Sea while the eight navies (China, France, India, ROK, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Russia and Vietnam) observed the exercise.¹²⁶

BILATERAL EXERCISES

Bilateral exercises started earlier in Southeast Asia than Northeast Asia. Also, the dyads of states tied by joint exercises show greater diversity in combination in Southeast Asia than in Northeast Asia. Bilateral defence cooperation in Southeast Asia during the Cold War stemmed from the threat of communist insurgency.¹²⁷ After Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, however, joint air and naval exercises with focus on conventional warfare gathered momentum amongst the Southeast Asian states in the 1980s.¹²⁸ One of the first bilateral

exercises launched was between the navies of Singapore and Indonesia codenamed *Exercise Eagle* in 1974. In the mid-1980s, the number of bilateral exercises increased, including those between Indonesia and Singapore (*Elang Indopura*, *Ex Indopura* and *Ex Safkar Indopura*), Malaysia and Singapore (*Ex Malapura*, *Ex Sarex* and *Ex Semangat Bersatu*) and Indonesia and Malaysia (*Ex Kekar Malindo*, *Ex Malindo Jaya*, *Elang Malindo* and *Ex Malindo Darsasa*).¹²⁹ In the post-Cold War era, ties of joint exercises expanded to those between Malaysia and Thailand (*Land Ex Thamal*, *Sea Ex Thamal*, *Thalay Laut* and *Air Thamal*), Malaysia and Brunei (*Ex Hornbill* and *Malbru Setia*), Malaysia and the Philippines (*Ex Sea Malphi*), Singapore and Brunei (*Ex Airguard*) and Singapore and the Philippines (*Anoa-Singa*).¹³⁰

Countries in Southeast Asia also conduct exercises with outside powers, the main counterpart of which is the United States. Examples are *Balikatan*, an armed forces exercise between the Philippines and the United States that began in 1981, *Cobra Gold*, a combined military exercise between Thailand and the United States which has been held since 1982 annually in Thailand. Drugs being Thailand's top national security threat, *Cobra Gold* in the late 1990s has focused on non-traditional military missions such as drug trafficking and money laundering.¹³¹ In addition to *Balikatan* and *Cobra Gold*, bilateral exercises the United States conduct in Southeast Asia and Australasia include *CARAT* (*Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training*) (a series of bilateral exercises conducted since 1995 that bring naval forces of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in contact with the U.S. Navy), *Commando Sling* (an air exercise with Singapore that began in 1990) and *Tandem Thrust* (a biennial combined exercise with Australia). As is the case with *Cobra Gold*, *Commando Sling* and *Tandem Thrust* went multilateral when the former was joined by the Royal Australian Air Force in 1998 and the latter exercise joined by the Canadian forces in 1999.

In Northeast Asia, Japan and the ROK also hold joint bilateral exercises actively with the United States. Annual exercises between Japan and the United States include *Cope North* (an air exercise conducted since 1978) and *Keen Edge/Keen Sword* (*Keen Edge* and *Keen Sword*, a field training exercise, are held alternately each year since 1997). Exercises between the ROK and the

United States include *Team Spirit* (a combined field maneuver exercise held between 1976 and 1993) and *Foal Eagle* (a combined rear-area exercise conducted since 1961).

What is remarkable about bilateral exercises in Northeast Asia is that, as is the case with bilateral dialogues, countries began exercises with those that had not done so previously. Examples include exercises between China and the United States, Japan and Russia and Japan and South Korea. From 3-5 December 1998, the U.S. Navy and PLAN conducted a joint search and rescue (SAR) exercise (SAREX 98) south of Hong Kong.¹³² The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) has been conducting an SAR exercise with the Russian Navy and the ROK Navy since 1998 and 1999 respectively.

High-Level Visits and Defence Academic Exchanges

As security dialogues have intensified, so have other various types of military exchange including reciprocal visits and exchange of academics. In Northeast Asia, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia have regularly made reciprocal visits, port calls and educational exchanges since the 1990s. Educational exchanges are also increasing. For instance, China has defence academic exchanges with Australia, Japan and the United States through the respective national defence universities.

Prior Notification of Military Activities

Notification of military activities in advance can avoid misinterpretation that a military exercise is an act of aggression. Although such a notification requirement is non-existent in the naval theatres of the region, prior notification is stipulated in two CBM border agreements between China and India and among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz and Tajikistan. China and India agreed that when conducting a military exercise near the line of actual control in the agreed border area involving more than 5,000 troops, each side would give the other side prior notification regarding type, level, planned duration and area of exercises.¹³³ In the five-power CBM agreement, the successor of the 1990 Soviet-Chinese CBM agreement,¹³⁴ China, Russia and the others are to notify

each other of the military activities in the 100-km area of the border line involving more than 25,000 people at least ten days before their commencement.¹³⁵ As is the case with the PRC-India CBM agreement, the five-power CBM agreement requires the parties to give advance notification regarding, among others, the number of the military personnel and battle tanks and other weapons and platforms.¹³⁶

Invitation of Observers to Military Activities

As shown in the discussion of military exercises, participants of military exercises are increasingly voluntarily inviting observers to their exercises. To cite an example, at the 1998 RIMPAC two PLAN officers became the first Chinese participants to observe the naval exercise. One of the few, if any, agreements that prescribe invitation of observers is the mentioned five-power CBM agreement among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz and Tajikistan. The agreement stipulates that the party conducting military exercises within the 100-km area from the agreed borderline involving more than 35,000 people “shall invite observers of the other party.”¹³⁷

Military Hotlines

Military hotlines between the heads of states can prevent inadvertent wars from occurring. The most important example of which is the one between the United States and the Soviet Union established in 1963. In the mid- and late 1990s, hotlines were established between states in East Asia. Chinese President Jiang Zemin agreed with his Russian and American counterparts Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton to set up a presidential hotline between their countries in 1996 and 1997 respectively.¹³⁸ Russian Pacific Fleet established one with Japan and South Korea in 1999.¹³⁹ Japan and the ROK also agreed to a hotline in 1999.¹⁴⁰ Although it is low level, marine rescue centers of China and Taiwan reached an agreement to set up a hotline for maritime rescue in the Taiwan Strait. Lastly, though not established, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il discussed a military hotline between the two Koreas at the historic summit meeting in June 2000. States in the region should encourage Seoul and Pyongyang to establish one since the Korean Peninsula is where a hotline is most needed.

Constraint Measures

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ)

The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) was concluded in December 1995, the idea of which has existed since as early as 1973.¹⁴¹ The treaty came into force in March 1997 when Vietnam, the seventh signatory, ratified it. The SEANWFZ comprises not only the territories but also the continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of all the ten states in Southeast Asia, that is, all the ASEAN members. Within this Zone, parties to the treaty are not to produce, develop, acquire, possess, use or transfer nuclear weapons. Because no nuclear powers are the parties to the treaty, the SEANWFZ is more of a non-nuclear manifestation of ASEAN than an operationalised and effective denuclearisation mechanism. To date, nuclear weapons states are reluctant to accede to the treaty mainly because of its inclusion of continental shelves and EEZs. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 1999, however, China and Russia notified their intent to sign the SEANWFZ protocol.¹⁴² They should do so as soon as possible and encourage other nuclear states to do the same.

Demilitarised Zones (DMZ)

The creation of demilitarised zones (DMZ) increases warning time and avoids minor clashes from escalating into war. DMZs also make surprise attacks more difficult. An area where such a buffer zone exists in the region is the Korean Peninsula. A 248-km military demarcation line (MDL) was drawn at the 38th parallel and a sixty-four million square feet DMZ, which ranges two kilometres north and south of the MDL, was created by the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. Nearly one million soldiers of both sides face against each other across the DMZ.

Limitation of Military Forces and Activities

China and India reached an agreement that they would reduce or limit the number of armaments in their agreed border areas such as combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns with larger than 75-mm calibre, mortars with larger than 120-mm calibre, surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).¹⁴³ The agreement does not 'limit' or 'restrict' military activities in a strict sense, but the two states agreed that both sides would "avoid holding large scale military exercises involving" more than 15,000 troops near the line of control in the border areas.¹⁴⁴ China and Russia agreed each other not to conduct military exercises exceeding 40,000 people in the Eastern part and either four thousand people or fifty battle tanks in the Western part of the Russian-Chinese borders.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, along the Eastern part of the Russian-Chinese border, Beijing and Moscow are only allowed to conduct a military exercise once a year that involves more than 25,000 people.¹⁴⁶

ASSESSMENT

Has multilateral security cooperation progressed in accordance with the naval arms developments in the region? The foregoing discussion showed that the region has engaged far more in transparency measures than constraint ones. The security dilemma suggests that the heart of the problem is cognitive dynamics—ideas, beliefs and perception—of states' leaders and policy-makers. Therefore, particularly relevant here in an analysis of arms race prevention is transparency measures. In this light, the region has taken a step in the right direction. In this analysis of the effectiveness of CBMs in arms race prevention, the final part of this paper begins with the examination of the effects upon which these measures have had the cognitive dynamics of the policy-makers and the content and scope of the information that is made available to outsiders.

Achievements of CBMs: Transparency Measures

Confidence Built?

One of the important objectives of CBMs is, as the term speaks for itself, to build confidence or trust between states. In 1999, U.S. Assistant Secretary of

State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth made a remark on the positive effect of the ARF upon building confidence among the participants:

[The ARF] is often criticized as a talkfest, and I think what people fail to recognize when you sit at that table and look around and you see countries, many of which used to be enemies, some of whom had challenged each other on the battlefield, many of whom had never talked to each other, and suddenly you see they're all there for this meeting on a common agenda talking the same language and having a fairly active schedule in between the annual meetings at lower levels. You're actually physically constructing [a] Pacific community....¹⁴⁷

There is also a view that confidence is being built between China and the ARF participants, one of the important aims sought by many ARF members. A Canadian diplomat observed: "Over time and with enhanced exposure the Chinese delegation spoke more frequently, often without notes in advancing the Chinese position. Both publicly and privately in corridors, what would wash and would not wash in Beijing was made clear."¹⁴⁸

Similarly, many ASEAN defence force officials stated that joint military exercises contributed in providing transparency in military affairs as well as developing sound relations with neighbouring states.¹⁴⁹ Singaporean Defence Minister Tony Tan went further to say that military exercises were "the foundation of trust and honesty among neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia."¹⁵⁰ Given such remarks regarding the impacts of transparency measures upon the minds of the high-ranking officials, it is safe to conclude that the measures have contributed to building confidence, albeit indeterminate as to what extent they are so in preventing arms races or enhancing regional security.

Assessing the Content and Scope of Defence Papers

Given the importance of states' clarifying their military intentions and capabilities in easing fear and anxiety of their neighbours, it is essential that the content and scope of defence papers be examined. Although that an increasing number of East Asian countries began publishing their defence papers is an encouraging indication towards greater transparency, the content and scope of the information provided vary from country to country, and some defence papers fell short of many people's expectations. This diversity among the region's defence

papers is in part due to the absence of agreed set of standards on what acceptable defence policy papers should consist of. A defence paper should include at least four following categories: threat assessment (assessment of security environment), national security objectives, current defence posture including size of force, structure of force and weapons holdings and defence requirements including current and planned weapons procurement and defence budget.¹⁵¹

The defence White Papers and policy statements of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan cover all the four categories and provide comprehensive, precise and reliable information on their defence policies.¹⁵² In this regard, therefore, the defence papers of the relatively recent publishers are examined, namely China, Thailand, Indonesia and Cambodia.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

China released its fourth defence White Paper entitled *China's National Defense in 2002* in December 2002, two years since its third was published. It is more detailed and longer than the previous paper. China's defence White Paper shows improvement in every issue. For example, when the third defence paper was published in 2000, one analyst described the publication as a "welcome shift" as it demonstrated Beijing's "greater openness of the Chinese armed forces" and "growing adherence to international norms."¹⁵³ *China's National Defense in 2002* shows further improvement.

It consists of seven chapters on The Security Situation, National Defense Policy, The Armed Forces, National Defense Building, Armed Forces Building, International Security Cooperation and Arms Control and Disarmament.¹⁵⁴ It assesses security environment (Chapter 1) and discusses national security objectives (Chapter 2). In comparison with the previous paper, it gives more detailed discussion on the PLA (Chapter 3). It stipulates primary missions of the PLA, PLAN and PLA Air Force. It also briefly provides several types of platform each armed force possesses, but the detailed information about weapons holdings is not given. For example, the number of individual platforms (e.g. Su-27s) or the number stationed to each military area command is missing, except

for the number of aircraft in an air regiment. It also lacks transparency in such key areas as current and planned weapons purchases

CAMBODIA

Cambodia's Defence White Paper *Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia: Security and Development* was issued in 2000, which is made up of seven chapters. The Defence White Paper 2000 makes clear how Phnom Penh views the security situation of the world and the region (Chapter Two) and assesses threats to its security (Chapters Two and Four). It also provides detailed information on Cambodia's national security objectives and the role and the strategy of its armed forces (Chapters Four and Five). While the Defence Paper discusses defence requirements (Chapter Seven), a more detailed description of the requirements could have been provided and thus would have increased the quality of the paper. For instance, instead of simply stating the country's necessity to develop "offshore patrol capabilities" for its Navy, it should stipulate what such capabilities would mean in the Cambodian security context and what they could possibly consist of. The description "vessels with improved sea keeping and a wide range of sensors and weapons systems" is too vague.¹⁵⁵ Neither the data on the size and structure of the armed forces nor the information on the current weapons holdings and the planned arms procurement are provided in the paper.

The False Premise of CBMs

Achievements of CBMs in East Asia suggest that the regional efforts in promoting transparency are favourable. Despite the seemingly successive records of CBMs, however, there are good cases made that arms races are discernible in the region, especially between China and Taiwan.¹⁵⁶ Does this mean that CBMs are irrelevant in arms race prevention or that CBMs are not yet well instituted in the region? The former question will be addressed first to illustrate that CBMs have limits in arms race prevention. Although CBMs are relevant, CBMs alone are not sufficient to prevent arms races. CBMs also have pitfalls. Though already pointed out elsewhere and also by some analysts in the region, the pitfalls of CBMs were not given due consideration in the early 1990s in the region. The discussion tended to polarise between advocates and

sceptics. While the former emphasised the positive effects that CBMs could bring to international relations of the region, the latter emphasised the negative effects—i.e., detriment to bilateral alliance structure and deterrent capability—and the inappropriate nature—i.e., Asian aversion to European concepts and differences in security situations and strategic cultures between Asia and Europe—of CBMs. The neglect of account of the concept of CBMs itself, especially the shortcomings, results from the region's over-enthusiasm for and overvaluation of CBMs, which is predicated on a false premise of CBMs.

Pitfalls of CBMs/Transparency Measures

A standard argument for CBMs is as follows: Because CBMs allow states to clarify their motives and military capabilities, states' fear and suspicions toward others are significantly reduced, thereby making war arising out of misunderstanding or misperception less likely. At least one of the assumptions underlying the proposition is problematic. That is, the benign intention of the participating states. Even though there is no guarantee that the intention of the CBM participants are peaceful, a generally accepted idea is that they are not hostile and wish to avoid war because they are willing to reveal their militarily significant data. That is, to put it differently, states can participate in CBMs unless they have something to hide. However, the truth may not be that they are willing to disclose information, but they only *appear* willing. This problematic assumption is not given due attention.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, even in cases where this assumption holds true, the effectiveness of transparency measures may not be as significant as often claimed. Because, by definition, CBMs are to be carried out between states which have little or no confidence, one party may not be able to fully trust the other party that he is not deceptive or does not conceal or manipulate its data. In such cases, states remain uncertain and suspicious even if others' intentions are in fact peaceful.

Conversely, in situations where governments indeed harbour aggressive intentions, CBMs may just as easily demonstrate such hostile intentions. This is helpful for potential victims, but does not contribute to arms race prevention. Clarification of intentions may actually exacerbate the situation. CBMs may only encourage, accelerate and consolidate states' military modernisation programs

so as to avoid being victims of the aggressors. As Sir Evelyn Baring, British governor in Egypt between 1883 and 1907, replied, when it was posited to him that enhancement of mutual understanding could reduce international hatred and suspicion, “the better they understand one another, the more they will hate one another.”¹⁵⁸ Transparency does not build confidence in these cases.

The problematic assumption advances a false and dangerous premise that the manifestation of states to participate in CBMs signifies their genuine interests in them and willingness to implement them. This premise led many to overlook the possibility that states may use CBMs as *rhetoric* to defend or pursue their other national interests, rather than to achieve CBMs’ original aim of building confidence. China is a case in point. Reversing its previous opposition to multilateral CBMs, Beijing decided to join the ARF. Behind this shift in China’s position lies its calculation that non-participation in the forum runs counter to its national interests. Observing that multilateralism is inevitable in the region, Beijing concluded that China has to participate in order to avoid or minimise restrictions on its behaviour and to shape the outcome of the process.¹⁵⁹ Beijing’s motive was also backed by the consideration that “China’s mere endorsement and participation” in the ARF could work to “dispel the perception of the ‘China threat’.”¹⁶⁰ Such a move, as one analyst observed, “represent[s] a change only in tactics and not yet in values.”¹⁶¹ Another evidence, which is at the same time detrimental to the value of transparency measures, indicating that China is employing CBMs as rhetoric is the Chinese allegation that “some information” *could* be shared “to make others comfortable.”¹⁶² The claim clearly demonstrates that transparency measures can be a useful ‘tool’ to conceal or manipulate states’ intentions and capabilities.

Lastly, although not directly related to CBMs *per se* but to multilateral security cooperation at large is the Chinese perception that security multilateralism serves to oppose the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and joint development of a missile defence.¹⁶³ Concerned about the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the possible introduction of missile defence to the region, China proclaimed that the consolidation of bilateral security alliances were counter to the development of security multilateralism. Chinese Foreign Ministers Qian Qichen and Tang Jiaxuan warned their

American and Japanese counterparts at the ARF ministerial meetings in 1997 and 1998 that such “Cold War mentality” would not guarantee, but destabilise the regional security.¹⁶⁴ Tang Jiaxuan further stated in July 2000:

Bilateral alliances are consolidating....Some people are hawking the Theatre Missile Defence program against the tide of our times. Such developments are compromising the regional confidence-building efforts and aggravating the instability of the regional security.¹⁶⁵

The two pitfalls of CBMs—the problematic assumption and that CBMs can be employed as rhetoric—confirm that the participation in CBMs means neither that the participants have genuine interests in CBMs nor that they are willing to negotiate, agree and implement them. At the same time, they also indicate that CBMs, especially transparency measures, alone are not sufficient to prevent arms races.

The False Promise of CBMs

If CBMs/transparency measures are not sufficient to keep arms races from emerging, further mechanisms are needed to prevent, in our definition of arms racing, states’ normal arms procurement from developing into abnormal ones. The most direct and effective way is to restrict the types and numbers of weapons, an arrangement normally referred to as arms control. As we saw in Part B, however, arms control agreements are nonexistent in the region. The two facts—that CBMs are not sufficient to avoid arms races and that arms control arrangements do not exist in East Asia—draw a conclusion that the region has not kept abreast of regional military developments and is not well instituted to prevent arms races. Why has the region only embarked on CBMs? Why are there no arms control arrangements in the region?

The region’s concentration on CBMs partly stems from the overestimation of CBMs or the mentioned false premise. The false premise advanced a false promise: Because participation represents states’ willingness to implement CBMs, they will be successful and effective. CBMs, especially transparency measures, were conceived as if they were a panacea for the security dilemma.

Such conception is particularly applicable in the Asia-Pacific. As one CBMs analyst has observed, within the ASEAN states,

transparency in military matters is increasingly being perceived (and depicted) as a sort of infallible remedy, or 'antidote', for preventing a spiralling arms race. Indeed, it is repeatedly suggested that the ASEAN nations' ever-growing acquisition of new and sophisticated weapon systems should not cause any concern because they have embarked on the road to military transparency.¹⁶⁶

Together with such a false promise, a generally accepted understanding of the important role played by CBMs in ending the East-West confrontation led to the "immense popularity" of CBMs in the post-Cold War era that for many to believe that CBMs do not fail once they are agreed to be implemented.¹⁶⁷ The same CBM analyst referred to this phenomenon as "an uncritical search for CBMs:"

Most examinations do not even consider that CBMs have an ambivalent or even negative result. For the true believers, they do not fail; they just take time...There is a strong sense among CBM enthusiasts that employment inevitably brings about something positive, and builds confidence.¹⁶⁸

The 'immense popularity' of CBMs was certainly discernible in the region. And, the 'uncritical search for CBMs' was manifested in the form of unexplored relations between CBMs and arms races. It seems that regional zeal for CBMs went unabated without much debate on the relationship between CBMs and arms races as to the process of how exactly the former can prevent the latter. There was an often-made argument in the early 1990s in the region that CBMs could be "useful in preventing military modernization programs from generating arms races."¹⁶⁹ Yet, their relations were never fully explored. The correlation between the two was often given:

[T]he concept of transparency posits that when a state knows the level and types of arms and the doctrines and military planning that a neighbouring state has, and the rate that its neighbour is arming or disarming, the changes for dangerous over-acquisition of arms or of potentially escalatory tension will be reduced.¹⁷⁰

But, because neither transparency measures nor constraint measures are arms limitation measures, how CBMs keep arms races from occurring is far from clear. Therefore, although dialogues are only one form of transparency measures, it was rightly pointed out when one analyst argued, “it is not hard to envisage a coming decade of continued security dialogue and continued arms build-ups, neither seeming to have much to do with the other.”¹⁷¹

CBMs as a Prelude to Arms Control?

CBMs were more attractive to the region partly because they demand states' minimum commitment. While arms control usually calls for legal obligations, CBMs only require political will. Informality being one of the important attributes of the strategic culture in the region, CBMs were more receptive and considered more appropriate and feasible. Arms control, on the other hand, was thought premature for the region's security environment and strategic culture.

Also, characterised as the other side of the coin of arms control or “functional arms control,” CBMs are closely associated with arms control, and often regarded as the preceding stage of arms control.¹⁷² CBMs are understood as short-term stabilising measures whereas arms control arrangements are seen as for long-term stability.¹⁷³ CSCE's subsequent arms control agreements such as the Open Skies and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaties may have reinforced such an idea that CBMs were the necessary precursors to successful arms control arrangements. This is evidenced by the Australian and Canadian proposals in 1990 for the creation of CSCE-type institution or CSCA. Granted that CBMs are a prelude to arms control, this is not at all the same as stating that CBMs bring about arms control. CBMs may help pave the way for arms control agreements, but “there is no serious basis for the belief that CBMs can lead to arms control agreements.”¹⁷⁴ Thus, hopes that beginning with the easily negotiated or less contentious CBMs will somehow find its way to the agreement of more difficult CBMs and arms control as time evolves are too optimistic and dangerous.

Why is the Region Under-Instituted?

It has been illustrated that endorsement of CBMs promises neither that participating states are genuinely interested in implementing such measures nor that CBMs will be successful and effective. Nevertheless, the fact still remains that CBMs work only when they are implemented, and their effectiveness hinges upon states' willingness to implement them. In spite of the pitfalls, moreover, CBMs are highly significant when implemented. What the analyses of regional achievements and the false premise of CBMs suggest, however, is that for CBMs to be effective, they must be *fully* implemented. Although the regional trends in CBM efforts are favourable, because they still lack full implementation the region has not reached a point where it is sufficient to prevent arms races. Partial implementation or compliance only exhibits partial results. Unless they are fully implemented, the security dilemma cannot be fully eliminated. Why don't states fully comply with CBMs? Or, why are they inclined to implement some measures and not others?

Absence of the Acceptance of the Status Quo

For successful implementation of CBMs and arms control, one critical condition has not yet met in East Asia. That is, the acceptance of the *status quo*. As discussed, this requires states' willingness to disclose their military forces, which, then, presupposes the absence of hostility. CBMs are not designed to cope with governments which plan to resort to force. The Indian-Pakistani relations illustrate this point in that their agreed CBMs have often been neglected.¹⁷⁵ Unless disputes are resolved or at least states are willing to resolve them and to build confidence with former belligerents, states will be reluctant to provide information that directly relates to their security and national interests. As one Chinese security analyst contended, "To implement transparency, the condition is that countries have confidence in the other parties. There should be no animosity."¹⁷⁶ Another Chinese military officer added that since there is "much hostility and suspicion in this region, it is unreasonable to ask militaries...to be transparent."¹⁷⁷ For successful CBMs, therefore, there must be a situation where states do not wish to change the *status quo*. The acceptance of the *status quo* is in fact often considered a precondition for CBMs and arms control.¹⁷⁸ As the same Chinese analyst maintained, CBMs were made possible in Europe "only after the big issues were resolved and a

propitious environment was created.”¹⁷⁹ Without the resolution of disputes in East Asia where there are over thirty unresolved territorial and sovereignty disputes, the disputing states would unlikely accept the *status quo*; instead they may wish to change it.

Primacy of State Interests

Sovereignty is a very important concept for states in East Asia. Needless to say, it is important to any state of the international system, but arguably the importance of which has been reiterated far more often in East Asia than other regions. The primary reason that CBMs are not instituted to the point where it is sufficient to prevent arms races is that states are hesitant to agree on any measures that may impinge upon their national interests, particularly those relating to sovereignty. This is also a primary reason for the region’s inability to move beyond simple transparency measures to more intrusive constraint measures. As Desmond Ball has observed, the measures instituted thus far “do not impinge on core national interests—i.e., territorial claims and other sovereignty issues, defence capabilities and operations, or internal political processes (which might be affected by more transparent policy-making).”¹⁸⁰ China provides a good illustration.

Declaring Taiwan as part of China, Beijing officially acknowledges the possibility of resorting to force if necessary to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence.¹⁸¹ Prevention of Taiwan independence is one of the crucial national interests of China. Because sovereignty and territorial integrity is given the highest priority on its agenda, Beijing will not allow any measures that may be detrimental to its Taiwan strategy. Chinese officials and analysts have serious reservations about CBMs whose increased transparency would diminish China’s deterrent capabilities, especially its capability to deter Taiwan independence and foreign intervention in the Taiwan Strait.¹⁸² Also, recent findings suggest that most of China’s accessions to international arms control treaties are to those that are non-intrusive and costless.¹⁸³ Beijing’s approach to CBMs and arms control confirms that China values deterrence above reassurance, and is imbued with realpolitik precepts.¹⁸⁴

The Chinese case is not the only instance that is indicative of the region's prevailing mode of realpolitik strategy. For example, Malaysia's resurgent military modernisation program reflects its aim of narrowing the military imbalance with Singapore, which was in part generated by the uneven reduction of arms spending during the Asian economic crisis.¹⁸⁵ Since CBMs will be agreed and implemented through the ARF where decisions are made by consensus, the Chinese and Malaysian postures demonstrate that the prospects for regional arms control are dim in the foreseeable future, and, as Amitav Acharya argued, security multilateralism in East Asia "remains constrained by the primacy of state interests."¹⁸⁶

NOTES

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¹ Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security*, 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80.

² Charles A. Meconis and Michael D. Wallace, *East Asian Naval Weapons Acquisitions in the 1990s: Causes, Consequences, and Responses* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2000), p. xvi.

³ Amitav Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control*, Pacific Strategic Paper 8 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 2.

⁴ Panitan Wattanayagorn and Desmond Ball, "A Regional Arms Race?" in Desmond Ball, ed., *The Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 171.

⁵ Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23:1 (March 1979), pp. 14-15.

⁶ Susan G. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate," *Journal of Peace Research*, 34:1 (1997), p. 17.

⁷ For an examination of the reorientation of ASEAN defence strategies and doctrines, J.N. Mak, *ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975-1992: The Dynamics of Modernisation and Structural Change*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 103 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), Australian National University (ANU), 1993).

⁸ *International Herald Tribune*, 29 October 1992.

⁹ Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," *International Security*, 18:3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 104-105.

¹⁰ Buzan and Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," p. 18. Buzan and Segal also point out the necessity of MSC in the region on pp. 15, 16 and 20.

¹¹ Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control*, pp. 48-49.

¹² For example, Desmond Ball, Richard L. Grant, and Jusuf Wanandi (Foreword by Amos A. Jordan), *Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region*, (Washington, D.C.: Pacific Forum/Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1993) and Desmond Ball, *Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 83 (Canberra: SDSC, ANU, 1991).

¹³ "Defense Minister Interviewed on Arms Control," *FBIS-EAS-91-151*, 6 August 1991, p. 41.

¹⁴ The Hon. Datuk Seri Mohamed Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak, "Towards Cooperative Security and Regional Stability: The Malaysian View," in David Horner, ed., *The Army and the Future: Land Forces in Australia and South-East Asia* (Canberra: Directorate of Departmental Publications, Department of Defence, 1993), p. 137.

¹⁵ "Indonesia's Alatas on Need for Regional Security Talks," *FBIS-EAS-92-210*, 29 October 1992, p. 39.

¹⁶ For example, Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 136-152 and Gerald Segal, "Managing New Arms Races in the Asia/Pacific," *The Washington Quarterly*, 15:3 (Summer 1992), pp. 83-101.

¹⁷ For example, Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," pp. 78-112; Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, "The Military Build-up in Asia-Pacific," *The Pacific Review*, 5:3 (1992), pp. 197-208; and Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control*.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, for example, defines it as "a progressive, competitive peacetime increase in

armaments by two states or coalitions of states resulting from conflicting purpose or mutual fears." Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," *Public Policy*, 8 (1985), p. 41. Hedley Bull defines it as "intense competition between opposed powers or groups of powers, each trying to achieve an advantage in military power by increasing the quantity or improving the quality of its armaments of armed forces." Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961), p. 5.

²⁰ Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 78.

²¹ Buzan and Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics*, p. 79.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 80. See also Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations* (Hampshire/London: Macmillan Press in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1987), p. 73. In *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics*, the successor to *An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Buzan and Herring adds a new concept called 'arms build-down' to serve as an alternative end of the spectrum, instead of 'maintenance of the military status quo'. In other words, the relationship between 'arms build-down' and 'maintenance of the military status quo' is that the former can escalate into the latter and the latter can subside into the former. However, for the purpose of the distinction between normal and abnormal operations of the arms dynamic, we will follow the earlier work of Buzan.

²³ *Ibid.* Between the two extreme ends in the scale lie 'arms competition' and 'arms build-up'. Buzan and Herring argue that virtually all relations between potential adversary fall into this "gray area between maintenance and racing."

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

²⁵ Bruce Russett, *The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence, The Arms Race, and Arms Control* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1983), p. 70.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Buzan and Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics*, p. 83.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, 30:2 (January 1978), pp. 211-214. See also George H. Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: John Wiley, 1977) and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security*, 9:1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 188 and 193.

³² For a discussion of the offence-defence theory, Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security*, 22:4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" *International Security*, 22:4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," *Security Studies*, 4:4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691; and Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly*, 28 (1984), pp. 219-238.

³³ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 25-26.

³⁴ Eric Grove, "Naval Technology and Stability," in Win A. Smit, John Grin, Lev Voronkov, eds., *Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a Changing World* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), p. 212.

³⁵ Rear Admiral J.R. Hill, *Arms Control at Sea* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 138.

³⁶ Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Security Studies*, 3:1 (Autumn 1993), p. 48.

³⁷ See Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 203-204.

³⁸ Desjardins, *Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures*, p. 198.

³⁹ Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 205 and Bates Gill, "Enhancing National Military Capabilities in Asia-Pacific: Legitimate needs versus unwarranted development," in Mohamed Jawhar Hassan and Sheikh Ahmad Raffie, eds., *Bringing Peace to the Pacific: Tenth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, June 5-8, 1996, Kuala Lumpur* (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 1997), p. 225.

⁴⁰ Grove, "Naval Technology and Stability," pp. 200-201.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁴² Hill, *Arms Control at Sea*, p. 145.

⁴³ Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," pp. 94-95.

⁴⁴ Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control*, p. 48.

⁴⁵ Sam Bateman, "Dangerous Waters Ahead," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 28 March 2001, p. 27. See also Prasun K. Sengupta, "Malaysia's Force Modernisation Plans Back on Stream," *Asian Defence Journal*, December 1999, pp. 14-17; Shawn W. Crispin, "On Their Marks," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 October 2000, pp. 29-30; Malcolm R. Davis, "Back On Course," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 24 January 2001, pp. 22-27; S. Jayasankaran, "Call for Arms," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 May 2002, p. 20; and Anthony Bergin, "East Asian Naval Developments: Sailing into Rough Seas," *Marine Policy*, 26 (2002), pp. 121-131.

⁴⁶ Unless noted otherwise, the following is based upon the data provided in IISS, *The Military Balance*, London: Oxford University Press/IISS, various years.

⁴⁷ Gary Klintworth, "China's strategic partnership with Russia," *The Defence Reporter*, October 2001, p. 31.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁴⁹ Crispin, "On Their Marks."

⁵⁰ Crispin, "On Their Marks."

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- ⁵¹ Michael Sirak, "Malaysia seeks Super Hornets to augment F/A-18 fleet," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 18 September 2002, p. 17 and Jayasankaran, "Call for Arms."
- ⁵² Paul Jackson, ed. (compiled by Lindsay Peacock), "China," *Jane's World Air Forces*, Issue 15 (Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group, 2002), p. 76.
- ⁵³ Davis, "Back On Course," pp. 25-26.
- ⁵⁴ See, for example, Robert Karniol, "China adds to drone stable," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 4 December 2002, p. 14.
- ⁵⁵ *Jane's All the World's Aircraft*, p. 82 and *Jane's World Air Forces*, p. 76.
- ⁵⁶ *Jane's World Air Forces*, p. 14.
- ⁵⁷ All surface ships with both 1,000 tonnes full load displacement and a weapons system for other than self-protection. They include aircraft carriers (ships with a flight deck that extends beyond two-thirds of the vessel's length), cruisers (over 8,000 tonnes, normally with an anti-air role and perhaps an anti-submarine capability), destroyers (less than 8,000 tonnes, with an anti-air role and perhaps an anti-submarine capability) and frigates (less than 8,000 tonnes, normally with an anti-submarine role). IISS, *The Military Balance*.
- ⁵⁸ Klintworth, "China's strategic partnership with Russia," p. 30.
- ⁵⁹ *Jane's Naval Weapon Systems*, pp. 323-325.
- ⁶⁰ Klintworth, "China's strategic partnership with Russia," p. 30.
- ⁶¹ "China to buy more advanced Russian warships," *The Straits Times*, 5 November 2002.
- ⁶² Davis, "Back On Course," p. 22.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁵ Richard Scott, "Singapore reveals Project Delta frigate," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 27 November 2002, p. 14.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁷ Davis, "Back On Course," p. 23.
- ⁶⁸ Davis, "Back On Course," pp. 23-24.
- ⁶⁹ Davis, "Back On Course," p. 24.
- ⁷⁰ "China to buy more advanced Russian warships," *The Straits Times*, 5 November 2002.
- ⁷¹ Commodore Stephen Saunders RN, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships 2002-2003* (Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group, 2002) p. 378.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 390 and 632. AC in LCAC stands for Air Cushioned.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 425.
- ⁷⁴ "AMRAAM Release Nears," *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, March/April 2002, p. 25.
- ⁷⁵ Robert Karniol, "The Jane's Interview," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 19 February 1994, p. 52.
- ⁷⁶ M. Susan Pederson and Stanley Weeks, "A Survey of Confidence and Security Building Measures," in Ralph Cossa, ed., *Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), pp. 81-100. Pederson and Weeks handle declaratory measures independent of transparency measures, making it the third type of CBMs. But declaratory measures are included in transparency measures since the former are "statements of intent" that attempt to reassure others, which can fall into the definition of the latter.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁸ Malcolm Chalmers, "Openness and Security Policy in South-east Asia," *Survival*, 38:3 (Autumn 1996), p. 87.
- ⁷⁹ Conference for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), *The Security of the Asia Pacific Region*, CSCAP Memorandum No. 1 (April 1994), p. 3.
- ⁸⁰ CSCAP, *Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures*, CSCAP Memorandum No. 2 (June 1995), p. 1.
- ⁸¹ John Gerald Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in John Gerald Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an International Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), chapter 1, especially p. 11.
- ⁸² 6 ASEAN states: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; 7 ASEAN's Dialogue Partners: Australia, Canada, the European Union (Presidency), Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the United States; 2 ASEAN's Consultative Partners: China and Russia; and 3 ASEAN's Observers: Laos, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam.
- ⁸³ Cambodia became a member in 1995; India and Burma in 1996; Mongolia in 1998; and North Korea in 2000.
- ⁸⁴ *Chairman's Statement*, The First ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, 25 July 1994.
- ⁸⁵ *Chairman's Statement*, The First ASEAN Regional Forum.
- ⁸⁶ *Chairman's Statement*, The Second ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, 1 August 1995.
- ⁸⁷ *The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper*, 1995.
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁰ *Chairman's Statement*, The Third ASEAN Regional Forum, Jakarta, 23 July 1996.
- ⁹¹ *Chairman's Statement*, The Fourth ASEAN Regional Forum, Subang Jaya, Malaysia, 27 July 1997.
- ⁹² *Chairman's Statement*, The Sixth ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, 26 July 1999.
- ⁹³ *Chairman's Statement*, The Fifth ASEAN Regional Forum, Manila, 27 July 1998.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

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- ⁹⁵ “Bei-Ro-Chū TMD de Tairitsu Senmei” (A Clear Rivalry over TMD among the United States, Russia and China), *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 July 2000, page 2; “Misairu Bōei Shisutemu Hitsuyō” (Missile Defence System Necessary), *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 July 2000, page 3; and “Kita-Chōsen to no Taiwa Kakudai Kangei” (Welcoming Expanded Dialogue with North Korea), *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 28 July 2000, page 8.
- ⁹⁶ *Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures*, Tokyo, 18-19 January 1996 and Jakarta, 15-16 April 1996.
- ⁹⁷ See *Distillation of Agreed CBMs from First up to the Fourth ARF and Co-Chairs’ Consolidated List of Possible New ARF CBMs*, Annexes D and G of *Chairman’s Statement*, the Fifth ASEAN Regional Forum, Manila, 27 July 1998. The new CBMs were endorsed by the ARF foreign ministers at the fifth ministerial meeting.
- ⁹⁸ *Co-Chairmen’s Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures*, 1997-98 and 1998-1999. The latter report had only one sentence.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1997-98.
- ¹⁰⁰ See The Kuala Lumpur Statement, 8 June 1993 in Desmond Ball, *The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Its Record and Its Prospects*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 139, pp. 93-95.
- ¹⁰¹ Article VIII.1, *The CSCAP Charter* in Ball, *The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific*, p. 100.
- ¹⁰² Cited in Ball, *The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific*, p. 15.
- ¹⁰³ Sheldon W. Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: The CSCAP Experience,” *The Pacific Review*, 15:2 (2002), p. 188.
- ¹⁰⁴ Ball, *The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific*, p. 15.
- ¹⁰⁵ See CSCAP’s official website at <<http://www.cscap.org/csbms.htm>>.
- ¹⁰⁶ “The First Malaysia-Singapore Defence Forum,” *Asian Defence Journal*, March 1995, pp. 15-17 and Robert Karniol, “Forum offers new era to Singapore/Malaysia,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 28 January 1995, p. 16.
- ¹⁰⁷ The Ministry of Defence, Thailand, *The Defence of Thailand 1994* (Bangkok: Strategic Research Institute, National Institute of Defence Studies, 1994) and *The Defence of Thailand 1996* (Bangkok: Strategic Research Institute, National Institute of Defence Studies, 1996).
- ¹⁰⁸ Major-General Dato Nordin Yusof and Abdul Razak Baginda, *Honour and Sacrifice: The Malaysian Armed Forces* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, 1994).
- ¹⁰⁹ Chalmers, “Openness and Security Policy in South-east Asia,” pp. 91-92.
- ¹¹⁰ Foreword, *The Annual Security Outlook 2000*.
- ¹¹¹ *The Annual Security Outlook 2001*. Five ASEAN states submitted their papers. Though submitted in 2000, India did not present its paper in 2001.
- ¹¹² *The Annual Security Outlook 2002*. Four ASEAN states presented their papers. Countries absent from the last volume were China, Malaysia, Mongolia and Vietnam. (India has not submitted its paper since the first ASO.)
- ¹¹³ United Nations General Assembly document A/RES/46/36L, 9 December 1991, available from the UN website at URL <<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/ares4636l.html>>.
- ¹¹⁴ Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles or missile systems. For the definitions of these weapons, see *Ibid.*, ANNEX.
- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, paragraph 10.
- ¹¹⁶ However, China has not submitted since 1997. Edward J. Laurence, Siemon T. Wezeman and Herbert Wulf, *Arms Watch: SIPRI Report on the First Year of the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, SIPRI Research Report No. 6 (New York: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1993) and Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, *Taking Stock: The UN Register After Two Years*, Bradford Arms Register Studies No. 5 (West Yorkshire, UK: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford/Westview Press, 1995).
- ¹¹⁷ In addition to the nine states mentioned, Canada, Papua New Guinea, Russia and the United States have reported.
- ¹¹⁸ Chalmers and Greene, *Taking Stock: The UN Register After Two Years*, p. 49 and The UN Register of Conventional Arms website, URL <<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html>>.
- ¹¹⁹ Taiwan was not asked to submit its report for not being a UN member.
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- ¹²¹ “Flying Fish off Singapore,” *Navy News*, 24 July 2000. For earlier FPDA exercises, see, for instance, “Five Power Defence Arrangement: Maintaining Closer Ties,” *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum* (November 1988), pp. 17-19.
- ¹²² Major Christopher W. Hughes, “Exercise Cobra Gold—Going Multinational,” *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum* (Winter 2000-01), pp. 3-13.
- ¹²³ “Exercise Pacific Reach,” *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum* (Fall 2001), pp. 4-9.
- ¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- ¹²⁵ Lt. j.g. John Perkins, “Japan Leads Exercise to Save Submariners’ Lives: Pacific Reach 2002,” *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum* (Summer 2002), pp. 26-31.
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- ¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 53. Micool Brooke, "Do Joint Military Exercises Enhance Security In ASEAN?" *Asian Defence Journal* (September 1999), p. 6.
- ¹²⁹ For a list of bilateral exercises in ASEAN between 1972 and 1993, Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control*, pp. 36-37.
- ¹³⁰ Ball, *Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region*, pp. 41-47.
- ¹³¹ Rodney Tasker and Bertil Linter, "Nasty Job for Task Force 399," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 April 2001, pp. 24-25 and Saritdet Marukatat, *Bangkok Post*, 16 November 2001; and Marukatat, and "The Real Facts About Cobra Gold," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 April 2002, pp. 8-9. See also Shawn W. Crispin, "The American Role," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 October 2000, p. 30.
- ¹³² Brendan Delfino, "PLA Joins Forces with US in Historic Exercise," *South China Morning Post*, 3 December 1998.
- ¹³³ Article IV (2), *Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas*, 29 November 1996. See also *Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas*, 7 September 1993.
- ¹³⁴ *Agreement between the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Guidelines of Mutual Reduction of Forces and Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Area of the Soviet Chinese Border*, 24 April 1990.
- ¹³⁵ Article 5, *Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan and People's Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area*, 26 April 1996.
- ¹³⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹³⁷ Article 6, *Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan and People's Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area*.
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- ¹⁴⁴ Article IV (1), *Ibid.*
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¹⁶⁷ Desjardins, *Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures*, p. 17.

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